Abstract-The Internet of Things will scale to billions of devices in the next coming years. A secure communication framework is needed to interconnect all these objects, by taking into account their intrinsic constrained in terms of energy, cpu and memory; Several proposals relying on adapting existing well-known and standardized security solutions exist, but we believe there is still a gap for most-constrained nodes to provide fine-grained authorization and secure establishment of fresh cryptographic keys. We propose a mechanism that runs on top of the OAuth Authorization architecture and provides the bootstrapping of fresh authenticated symmetric cryptographic material between previously unknown parties using a noncebased protocol. We set up an energy measurement platform to evaluate our proposal and compare it with existing work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Constrained Nodes and Networks are predominant on the Internet of Things (IoT). Constraints include limited ROM, RAM, energy and bandwidth. Basic security services as Authentication, Authorization and Confidentiality are needed on most of the IoT scenarios. Standard security solutions such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), TLS, X.509 Certificates, and in general asymmetric cryptography, are not directly applicable to the IoT scenarios due to the constrained nature of the nodes and networks.
Several works proposing adaptations of existing solutions or creating new ones exist for bringing the basic security services for the IoT. However, not many address the problem for the most constrained nodes and for very-constrained Low-Power Wide-Area networks: energy and bandwidth are very limited and optimizing the bytes to communicate is a priority. For the constrained node asymmetric cryptography is cpu and memory intensive; hence any solution relying on certificates, signatures, Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement, is excluded.
Our proposal defines an OAuth 2.0-based Authentication and Authorization Framework suitable for the most constrained nodes and networks. We optimize the communication and the cryptographic operations at the node. The proposal will allow the establishment of an authenticated symmetric key, with fine-grained authorization permissions associated, between previously unknown parties. We base our work on nonce-based symmetric authenticated key establishment methods, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)'s OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession token and architecture, and other lightweight IETF's protocols. Our proposal will be analyzed in terms of energy consumption at the constrained node and compared with existing solutions.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II briefly discuss related work on security on IoT and provides the needed background on which we build our solution. Section III describes our proposed solution. Section IV presents some energy considerations and empirical measurements. Finally, Section V offers some final conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND

A. Related Work
An introduction to the problem of securing the most constrained IoT nodes from an energy point of view is given in [1] . Establishment of cryptographic material between communicating parties is the building block of any other security service; [2] gives a thorough introduction to the authenticated key establishment problem for IoT and categorizes the possible solutions. Several lightweight key establishment proposal exist. In [3] the authors offer a scalable DTLS-based solution with a trusted-third-party (TTP), however symmetric key freshness is loosely assured by a nonce generated at the TTP and not at the constrained node (CN). An 6LoWPAN solution is presented in [4] for which they offer a formal proof of security, it solves the problem of a node joining a network. [5] offers an Identitybased approach, who leverages several scalability problems, and is based on asymmetric cryptography. EAP-over CoAP [6] bootstraps key material and only deals with authentication. The authorization problem for IoT, normally involving authentication, has been also studied thoroughly; [7] offers a comprehensive solution based on EAP-methods and timestamps. [8] solves the authentication problem building on top of 3GPP Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) using asymmetric cryptography and HTTP. IoT OAuth- solution exists, in [9] they profile OAuth-for IoT using regular tokens, but authenticated key establishment between unknown parties is out of scope. [10] uses also regular tokens that need to be transported securely, and freshness rely on timestamps validation.
B. Authorization: OAuth 2.0 for IoT
The OAuth v2.0 Authorization Framework [11] is an open standard that enables a resource owner to grant a third-party limited access to a protected resource. OAuth 2.0 provides an authorization layer that is designed to be used over HTTP. An authenticated secure channel between communicating parties is needed for most messages and is generally provided by a transport-layer security solution such as TLS.
Access Tokens are authorization credentials that grant access to the protected resources; they can have different formats, cryptographic properties and uses, one example is the bearer token: any party in possession can use it to get access to the associated resources. The Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Tokens are access tokens bound to a specific cryptographic key. Mere possession of the PoP token is not enough to prove authorization to access to a protected resource: possession of the PoP token's associated key must be proven too. PoP tokens' semantics, distribution and associated architecture are being developed at IETF's OAuth Working Group (WG) [12] . One desirable security property of PoP tokens is that they can be transported over unsecured channels.
IETF ACE's work-in-progress Authorization for the Internet of Things using OAuth 2.0 [13] aims at adapting OAuth v2.0 for the IoT. It uses PoP access tokens; HTTP is replaced by CoAP and JSON by CBOR, CoAP runs over UDP instead of TCP, and hence DTLS should be used instead of TLS. Application-layer security solutions are also envisioned and are based on COSE (CBOR Encoded Message Syntax) [14] and OSCOAP (Object Security of CoAP).
The protocols stack and data model representation needed for an entity taking part on the OAuth framework, assuming an IP layer, can be seen in Figure 1 .
1) The main entities involved in the OAuth framework are: • Resource Server (RS): An entity which hosts a protected resource.
• Authorization Server (AS): An entity that enforces RO's policies, prepares and endorses authorization and authentication data.
• Client (C): An entity which attempts to access a protected resource on a RS. 2) OAuth Message Flows: Figure 2 represents the basic OAuth 2.0 message flow. We assume the RO has preconfigured the authorization policies on the AS and it is not relevant on the flow.
The procedure that allows C to get access to a protected resource is the following: 1) C sends a Token Request message to the AS.
2) If C is authorized AS generates and sends to C the Access Token (opaque to C) and Client Information (e.g.: contains the key bound to the PoP access token). 3) C sends the Access Token to RS and the protected resource Request 4) RS validates the request with the associated access token, if successful, responds with a representation of the protected resource.
C. Authentication: Authenticated Key Establishment (AKE)
Authentication and key establishment protocols are the pillar of secure communications. Key Authentication is a property that ensures a party that another identified party is in possession of a particular key. An Authenticated Key Establishment (AKE) protocol is a key establishment protocol that provides key authentication. The current most used AKE protocols are the Kerberos v5 and authenticated DiffieHellman variants used on TLS cipher suites.
1) AKE and a Trusted Third Party: A relevant statement that has been formally proven to be true is that no fresh authenticated key establishment can be done if there is not already existing secure channels. For two entities that want to establish a fresh authenticated key this means that either they: (a) already share some cryptographic material; (b) share cryptographic material with a mutually trusted third party (TTP). For parties without shared cryptographic material the AKE establishment will involve a TTP either in an on-line fashion interacting on the protocol as an active party, or in an off-line fashion like in public key infrastructures.
2) AKE: Three-Party, Symmetric and Nonce-based: AKE protocols can be categorized depending on: the number of parties involved; the use of symmetric or asymmetric cryptography; the use of timestamps or nonces (to assure freshness). Three-party symmetric cryptography noncebased AKE protocols will be the basis for our work. In Figure 3 the message flows of the most relevant protocols in the literature are shown.
3) The Bauer Berson and Freiertag (BBF) protocol: Among the five highlighted AKE protocols we will focus on the the Bauer-Berson-Freiertag's (BBF) [15] . The main reason for this choice is a desired property of the messages flow: one of the involved parties does not need direct communication with the TTP. Otway-Rees protocol also has this property but attacks exists. While the BBF protocol has not a provably secure proof of security, being 3PKD the only one that has, it has no known-attacks. To describe BBF we define the following notation: A and B are entities wishing to establish a key; S is the Trusted Third Party (TTP); N A and N B are nonces generated by A, and by B respectively; K AS and K BS are the long-term shared keys between A and S, and by B and S respectively; Enc(m)K k Encryption of message m with the key K k ; K AB is the key to be shared by A and B. The BBF protocol run as follows: BBF AKE protocol on top of the OAuth Architecture. Authorization Server (AS) act as T T P , Client is party B, and Resource Server (RS) is party A. In solid lines are cryptographic-relevant Messages (KA and KB are long-term shared keys between RS and AS, and by Client and AS respectively).
deployments we can assume IPv6 addresses or DNS names.
D. Limitations of OAuth for IoT
The OAuth 2.0 profiled for IoT is a suitable solution for the authorization problem. The PoP Token offers also the secure establishment of an authenticated key -with associated authorization permissions-between previously unknown parties and over an unsecured channel; this key can be further used to establish authenticated and secured communications between these parties. In spite of this advantages we see a mayor drawback on the OAuth PoP token mechanism, its security relies either on: (a) the RS validating a timestamp on the token, or (b) RS directly communicating with AS to delegate the token validation (token introspection).
III. PROPOSAL: BBF AKE PROTOCOL ON OAUTH
Our proposal extends the OAuth 2.0 PoP [12] architecture and allows to run the BBF AKE protocol on top of it.
We define new types and flow of messages. The new flow of messages and associated BBF protocol's cryptographicrelevant information is shown in Figure 4 ; The Client (C) is the initiator of the OAuth protocol and act as party B in the AKE literature, the constrained Resource Server (RS) act as party A (the initiator of the BBF protocol), and the Authorization Server (AS) act as the T T P .
We extend the COSE [14] and CBOR Web Token (CWT) encodings, defining a new type of key_algorithm for the COSE_Key CBOR object; the object indicates that a BBF protocol key is being negotiated, and includes an associated context COSE_AKE_Context with the necessary fields to run the BBF protocol. The definition of the CBOR object can be formally described using the CBOR Data Definition Language (CDDL): We will describe the proposed protocol from a high level flow of the messages and its semantics, focusing on the constrained RS and the cryptographic operations and messages it will have to process. We assume that RS and AS share a long-term key K A , and the Client (C) and AS share the key K B . A successful run of our proposed protocol will be as follows:
1) C sends to RS an unauthorized CoAP Request (MSG 1 in Figure 4 ). 2) RS generates a nonce N A and together with a representation of its identity A sends a COSE_Key with the BBF information on the response (MSG 2). We show the payload in a JSON-like notation:
Header: Unauthorized (Code=4.02) Content-Format: "application/cose-key" Payload:< As per BBK AKE properties, C will associate the K AB with B identity and N A , which guarantees key's authentication and freshness. OAuth associated authorization permissions are in aif. Notice that the key_alg does not contain the value AKE_BBF but is now the algorithm that should be used for authenticated encryption, in this case AES-CCM mode 128-bit key, 64-bit tag, 13-byte nonce. 6) If RS correctly validated the last message it sends to C an ACK 2.04 Changed response (MSG 6)
After this exchange of messages C and RS, who previously shared no cryptographic material, will share a symmetric key K AB . This key's freshness and security properties are assured by the BBF AKE protocol; and is bound to an OAuth's Proof-of-Posession Access Token who grants to the holder-of-key fine-grained authorization permissions to access protected resources on RS. This K AB can be further used to set-up an authenticated and secured channel between C and RS by any method that can do so using a Pre-Shared-Key (PSK), such as DTLS-PSK or Object Security (COSE).
IV. CONSIDERATIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Design Considerations
We designed the protocol minimizing the resource consumption on RS, from a high level point of view this can be achieved minimizing:
• The number of bytes to communicate to and from other nodes (Bytes TX/RX. Energy).
• The cryptographic operations needed, qualitatively and quantitatively (CPU Power, RAM).
• ROM and RAM usage, by using an optimized protocol stack and information encoding schemes. We aim at energy constrained nodes, battery-powered typically with a CR2032 coin cell with a capacity of 225mAh.
B. Experimental Results 1) Test method:
Texas Instruments (TI) CC1310 was used as a constrained node. RAM and ROM usage were not measured empirically, focus was put on energy. We set up an energy-measurement platform using: (a) TI CC1310 Evaluation Module (EM): CPU ARM Cortex-M3 (@48 MHz), 128 KB of ROM, 20KB RAM, Sub-1 GHz Low Power Radio, AES-128 Security Module and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) module. (b) TI SmartRF06 Evaluation Board to program and debug the TI CC1310 EM, and to measure current consumption (voltage drop ∆V on a shunt resistor). (c) Tektronix TDS 3012 Digital Oscilloscope (100 MHz, 1.25 GS/s). We powered the Evaluation Board (EB) from the USB 5.0V source, the EB has a DC-DC converter to 3.30V. We used two different values for the shunt resistor used to measure ∆V: 5Ω and 22Ω. We also used an output digital pin as a trigger for the oscilloscope to capture the desired operation. Figure 5 illustrates the method used for measuring each operation, in this case the TRNG: it took 472 msec to generate a random number; the CPU enters a low-power mode while the TRNG gathers entropy, this explains the initial reduction in power consumption. Table I .
We can estimate the consumption of RS, in terms of mAh, to complete the protocol. We assume a packet overhead from Layer 2 to CoAP of 20B. Using Figure 4 as reference: • MSG 6: TX 25 Bytes (27.1mA x 5.8msec) The sum of the terms gives a total of 0,000557mAh. At 3.30V this is equivalent to 6.62 mJoules.
The proportional contribution of each operation to energyconsumption are: (1) If we use a CR2032 battery (225mAh) only for running the protocol we can do it in the order of 400 000 times before battery exhaustion. An application needing one protocol run per day and expected to run 15 years on the same CR2032 battery will use 1.4% of its capacity.
3) Axes for improvement: Avoiding the TRNG (71% of energy). We can generate one true randon number N 1 only at the first boot, once per node lifetime, and store it in flash/rom together with a counter n; then for each nonce N n needed: N n = AES-Encryption(N 1 + n) Knon . Being K non a key for this specific use and incrementing and storing n value. This improvement will give the protocol consumption of 0,000163mAh / 1,94 mJ@3.30V. Minimizing TX and RX; using Figure 4 as reference: MSG 6 is not related to security and can be avoided, giving a consumption of 0,000119mAh Table II lists energy consumption from the studied literature: our improved solution is in the order of 1.5 mJ, in line with the lowest-energy solutions. A more accurate empirical comparison should be done on the same hardware platform.
C. Perspectives
We envision having a complete implementation of the proposed framework running in constrained nodes and using a desktop PC as an Authorization Server. We are interested in doing energy measurements in different radio modes (e.g. low-energy), and RAM and ROM requirements. On the architectural point of view, we aim at having a flexible framework in which implementing other types of AKE protocols, like 3PKD, will be straightforward; then we can benchmark them and use the appropriate one depending on the constraints of the scenario envisioned. Securing and optimizing the application data exchange is also on scope.
V. CONCLUSION
Fine-grained dynamic authorization is a fundamental service in the IoT world to come. Establishment of authenticated cryptographic key material between previously unknown parties is also the pillar for secure communications. With our proposal we hope to have given a step forward towards a standardized solution that tackles both security problems. We have focused on the most constrained devices, particularly assuming constraints in terms of energy and the impossibility of time-based solutions to assure freshness.
